Tag Archives: Roberts

Roundup of Things to Read

At Jotwell,  has reviewed Rosie Harding’s, Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in Lesbian and Gay Lives (Routledge 2011).

Bringing pluralism and consciousness of law together allows for a much more expansive definition of legality and a more nuanced analysis of everyday narratives of law. Engagement with and resistance to the formal law is refracted through a variety of normative lenses other than the state law itself.

The empirical dimension of Harding’s book is equally significant and produces an amazingly rich picture of the complexities of lesbian and gay engagements with law, including the myriad forms of resistance and the diversity of positions which form lesbian and gay legal identities.

The amazing Dorothy Roberts has posted her The Social Context of Oncofertility (DePaul Law Review, Vol. 61, Page 777, 2012)   to SSRN, (h/t Lawrence Solum’s legal theory blog)

There are compelling ethical reasons to restore to women cancer survivors the capacity to have a child so easily preserved for men and for the public to support wide access to this restoration. Yet an investigation of the underlying structural injustices that place women in conditions of infertility, poor health, and inadequate access to medical care raise questions about the just distribution of public resources used to pay for oncofertility and other health care services.

The Legal Theory Blog is also recommending Jeremy Waldron’s 2009 Tanner Lectures “Dignity, Rank and Rights” (the Legal Theory Blog links to an OUP version, but I think that the lectures are available full text here.)   Canadian Constitutional/Charter/Equality scholars might be interested:

Together the two lectures illuminate the relation between dignity conceived as the ground of rights and dignity conceived as the content of rights; they also illuminate important ideas about dignity as noble bearing and dignity as the subject of a right against degrading treatment; and they help us understand the sense in which dignity is better conceived as a status than as a kind of value.