NS Finally came out today, as you probably know. The Supreme Court cases considered how law should deal with the claim of a niqab (don’t know what that is? check here) wearing woman who was to testify as a complainant in a sexual assault trial that wearing the niqab was a religious right – when the accused claimed the wearing of the veil contravened his fair trial rights.
Here is a little roundup.
First, the decision (my nutshell: N.S. Majority: Balancing. LeBel & Rothstein: Niqab is incompatible w fair trial. Abella dissents: No need to remove. )
Second, commentary. There’s not much deep commentary today, but there are quick thoughts and helpful summaries.
My colleage Faisal Bhabha, who appeared for one of the interveners who supported N.S., here in the Globe and Mail.
The court made it very clear that people are not required to park their religion at the door, so to speak,” said Mr. Bhabha…
Poli Sci Prof Emmett Macfarlane in Macleans here.
Balancing rules are akin to parking a tank on one side of a seesaw, writes Emmett Macfarlane…
So long as the decision to wear the niqab is made freely, it ought to be respected from a rights perspective. And in weighing so heavily the risks to a fair trial over not just the latitude given to religious freedom, but also the deleterious and societal effects of providing insufficient protection for them, the majority has handed trial courts a messy confluence of rules likely to do more harm than good.
Ruthann Robson of CUNY law putting Canadians to shame with her quick off the mark blog post here.
“From the perspective of US conlaw scholars, whether or not interested in comparative constitutional law, the Canada Supreme Court’s opinion in R. v. N.S. is an important one seeking to balance rights and addressing an issue that is percolating in the United States courts.”
There is much quick commentary available – especially on Twitter – all very canadian and clean.
— Vanessa MacDonnell (@vanessa_macd) December 20, 2012
From the Abella reasons:
 This has the effect of forcing a witness to choose between her religious beliefs and her ability to participate in the justice system: Natasha Bakht, “Objection, Your Honour! Accommodating Niqab-Wearing Women in Courtrooms”, in Ralph Grillo et al., eds., Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (2009), 115, at p. 128. As a result, as the majority notes, complainants who sincerely believe that their religion requires them to wear the niqab in public, may choose not to bring charges for crimes they allege have been committed against them, or, more generally, may resist being a witness in someone else’s trial. It is worth pointing out as well that where the witness is the accused, she will be unable to give evidence in her own defence. To those affected, this is like hanging a sign over the courtroom door saying “Religious minorities not welcome”.
 The order requiring a witness to remove her niqab must also be understood in the context of a complainant alleging sexual assault. As this Court stated in R. v. Mills,  3 S.C.R. 668, “an assessment of the fairness of the trial process must be made ‘from the point of view of fairness in the eyes of the community and the complainant’ and not just the accused” (para. 72): see also R. v. O’Connor,  4 S.C.R. 411, per McLachlin J., at para. 193. Creating a judicial environment where victims are further inhibited by being asked to choose between their religious rights and their right to seek justice, undermines the public perception of fairness not only of the trial, but of the justice system itself.
those thoughts are also behind this tweet from @blberger
Second last word
— (usually) S Lawrence (@OsgoodeIFLS) December 20, 2012
— Galldin Robertson (@GalldinRoberts) December 20, 2012
Your links and thoughts welcome in the comments or on FB